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PAUL, POMO, AND THE LEGITIMACY OF 
CHOICE POST 9/11: A BRIEF COMMENT ON 
THREE PAPERS 
Richard H. Weisberg* 
"Ideas have consequences, or else why would people like Mr. Fish 
feel so strongly about them?"^ 
"At least in one place, Fish (like Badiou) uses Pauline Christianity 
to elaborate what he terms (unlike Badiou) 'the post-modem lesson' 
that the story we humans enact 'is underwritten by nothing firmer or 
more 'objective' (independent) than the inner conviction of those 
who live it out. 
"1 wish to conclude with a very short consideration of the struggle 
between the weak thought of postmodernist discourse and the heavy 
rhetoric of fundamentalism. It is a mistake to erect these alternatives 
into sheer opposites. The 'darkness' of fundamentalism is often 
supported by a claim that Scripture has a univocal kind of 
transparency, and the 'lightness' of postmodern thought, while 
promoting a maximum of political openness, insists on the darkness 
(nontransparency) of texts. 
My prerogative and pleasure as co-convenor of this 
Conference are to comment (briefly) on just one set of stimulating 
papers, those given on the "Postmodernism" panel. For years— 
beginning really with my graduate student days "under" Paul de 
* Floersheimer Professor of Constitutional Law and Co-Director, Floersheimer Center 
for Constitutional Democracy, Benjsimin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. 
' Edward Rothstein, Porno at War, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1605,1608 (2003). 
2 Steven Mailloux, Contingent Universals: Religious Fundamentalism, Academic 
Postmodernism, and Public Intellectuals in the Aftermath of September 11,24 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1583,1600-01 (2003). 
3 Geoffrey Hartman, Transparency Reconsidered: On Postmodernism, 
Fundamentalism, and Other Dark Matters, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1569, 1578 (2003) 
(footnote omitted). 
1615 
1616 CARDOZO LA W REVIEW [Vol. 24:4 
Man and Geoffrey Hartman himself—^my own work has also 
touched on the limits to principled decision-making apparently 
laid down by various postmodernisms;" so the excellent 
contributions here of Hartman, Mailloux, and Rothstein made me 
think in a post-9/11 context of what has always already enhvened 
the resistance of classical thinking on the apparent innovations of 
the "pomos." 
I say "apparent" because these three papers reveal some 
salient similarities of thought, if not necessarily of expressioij. 
Rothstein correctly situates pomo within a broad classical tradition 
that permits the very tolerance that may produce "relativism." 
After all, the twentieth century's onset in Einstein and Freud 
established long before Derrida the uncertainty—^Hartman might 
call it the "hermeneutic perplexity"—^both of the cosmos and the 
individual human mind. Mailloux helpfully moves pomo towards 
this traditionalism by convincingly challenging Stanley Fish's 
assertion that there is no practical effect of a theory that 
everywhere seeks to deny even the possibihty of principled 
decision-making. And Hartman, whose superb paper otherwise 
evokes much of his earlier writing,^ situates Gianni Vattimo along 
a spectrum of thinkers who, although denying any transparency of 
the real in a complex world, nonetheless see "ethical life and 
historicality coinciding]... as an event of destiny." 
All three writers concur in Vattimo's suggestion that, as 
Hartman puts it, "[t]he risk of blankness or hermeneutic perplexity 
is not sustained."® Human beings, against all the odds, prefer to a 
pervasive system of doubt at least some form of certainty. For 
Fish, as convincingly re-interpreted through Mailloux, there must 
be a certainty precisely of the uncertainty of all interpretive acts. 
The absence of a principled basis for decision-making becomes, for 
some pomos, a fighting faith. Theory affects practice, as decision­
makers deny "indubitable proof" as Rothstein puts it, in favor of 
"power or reward or rhetoric." I have recently attempted to show 
that Fish falls back on the "principle" of the guild'^ some 
'' See, e.g., Richard Weisberg, On the Use and Abuse of Nietzsche for Modem 
Constitutional Theory, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC 
READER 181-92 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988), reprinted and 
expanded from Richard Weisberg, Text Into Theory: A Literary Approach to the 
Constitution, 20 GA. L. REV. 939 (1986). More recently, see Richard H. Weisberg, Fish 
Takes the Bait: Holocaust Denial and Postmodernist Theory, 43 CRITICAL QUARTERLY 
19-27 (Winter 2001) [hereinafter Weisberg, Fish Takes the Bait\, reprinted and revised in 
14 CARD. STUD. L. & LIT. 131 (2002). 
5 See, e.g., GEOFFREY HARTMAN, THE LONGEST SHADOW: IN THE AFTERMATH OF 
THE HOLOCAUST (1996). 
® Hartman, supra note 3. 
' Weisberg, Fish Takes the Bait, supra note 4. 
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postmodemisms merely internalize the power structure as the 
basis of all decision-making, and in so doing render themselves 
more rehant on externalities than those they attack for trying to 
rely on principle. 
Take, precisely, the debate about the events of 9/11 and the 
nation's appropriate response to them. One side (say, Rothstein's) 
wants to name, to take responsibility for a judgment that calls 
certain actors bad and thus certain responses justifiable. The other 
side (say, Mailloux's) wants to be more reflective about that act of 
naming—^wants to understand the "rhetorical paths of thought in 
the public sphere" that lead people to make such judgments; he 
may be far less willing than Rothstein to take a firm position 
within the developing discourse. In this sense, Hartman's very 
different, continentally oriented essay, helps clarify the reluctance 
to speak bluntly: 
Thus, in terms of intellectual history, postmodern critics battle 
the idea of decadence once more, attacking specifically its 
origin in retrospectively gilded fantasies of total social cohesion. 
But can we manage without a vocabulary of rise and fall?® 
Hartman's reluctance to call things by a specific name 
pervades his entire theoretical oeuvre. But, unlike Fish, he does 
not turn this rhetorical equivocation into a fighting faith; more 
importantly, he accepts the implications within his own style of an 
aversion to an absolutist vocabulary. For Hartman, World War II 
and (Hitler's) grotesque use of just such a clear rhetoric of naming 
places on postmodems an almost ethical responsibility to "limit the 
totahtarian temptation to use language and reason only 
instrumentally." To avoid the hideous repetition of dictatorial 
rhetoric, we must seek "recognition and intertextual density" 
rather than the directness of judgmental speech. 
I feel much more attuned to Hartman's explanation than to 
Fish's, and thus I welcome Mailloux's elaboration of Fish's un-self-
reflective theoretics. Our approach to public rhetoric does have 
consequences—^if we are trained to distrust principle, we are far 
less likely to act in accordance with even our most deeply held 
convictions; but what if (as in Hartman) the imbedded principle is, 
precisely, to avoid doing ultimate harm to others by repeating a 
version of absolute conviction that recent history compels us to 
avoid? 
Here I would intervene, as I did with Fish, wearing my hat as 
an historian of the Holocaust.' Studies of the discourse in Hitler's 
Europe have revealed a more complex rhetorical pattern than the 
^ Hartman, supra note 3, at 1574. 
' See RICHARD WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (1996). 
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usually complex Hartman assumes in his ethical desire to avoid 
simplistic speech. France found itself able to traduce all of its 
egalitarian values only through an extraordinarily textured effort of 
discursive flexibility. In much of Europe, and certainly in Vichy, 
people needed to be complex (not simplistic) to pump themselves 
towards a vicious racism that their engrained egalitarianism 
otherwise would have rejected. 
Once we posit a different premise from Hartman's—once we 
find that Hitler's Europe moved towards the unthinkable not 
because of a knee-jerk response to totalizing rhetoric, but instead 
through a complex process of discursive rationalization and 
change—^we must question Hartman's otherwise admirable project 
of theorizing verbal complexity. What was needed during Vichy 
was what Rothstein now proposes post 9/11: calling things by their 
proper names, and taking responsibihty for our own "vocabulary 
of rise and fall." 
Rothstein asks, "why should there be no way to definitively 
judge" the attack on the World Trade Center or any other such 
situation, but neither Mailloux nor Hartman, as we have seen, 
primarily directs his skepticism to any act of judgment. We all 
make judgments; to be avoided by pomo, instead, is on one hand 
the fallacy of making your judgment into a universal applicable to 
those you are judging, and on the other to pronounce emphatically 
your judgment knowing full well, because of history, that emphatic 
judgments pronounced on others can double back to victimize you 
and those you value. 
In the end, it all may come down to our manner of 
interpreting experience, whether we are looking at a text (like the 
Bible) or an event (like 9/11). Pomo seeks the maximum of 
complexity in this business of interpreting; the more classical 
vision from someone like Rothstein wants to conclude, not at all 
thoughtlessly, but based on an acquired and ultimately far more 
direct sense of right and wrong. But, if we place the Bible and 9/11 
side by side—as Mailloux does by bringing in Pauline Christianity 
towards the end of his paper—^we again find more agreement than 
argument between the two sides. 
Mailloux for the pomos concedes here that truth, although 
"not a proposition that corresponds to a pre-existing state of 
affairs... is something that happens and must be maintained." 
Saint Paul did name (as Rothstein wants us to do now). He called 
Jesus the Messiah, and this was absolute good; Rothstein wants us 
to call those who perpetrated 9/11 absolute evil. Those acts of 
naming are normatively not justified by any prior "objective" 
proof: Rothstein agrees early in his paper that we have no such 
2003] LEGITIMACY OF CHOICE POST 9/11 1619 
proofs about the cast of characters in 9/11, yet "wc judge [this 
being] the best that we can do [and] often something that we must 
do." Similarly, even if Saint Paul's efforts to ground his message in 
some Old Testament "proof" or prophecy were hopelessly skewed 
and interpretively dishonest,^" truth nonetheless emerges in Paul 
from "the product of truth procedures that are initiated by the 
naming of an event that emerges in a situation." 
Both of these seemingly antagonistic writers agree, finally, 
that people's positions, their judgments, their words, emerge 
largely from a non-universal and yet knowable originating 
moment, a departure from which all subsequent judgments may be 
made as to their "truth" or "falsity"; and this identifying of a 
moment of resolution—not so different from Vattimo's "event of 
destiny" as described (but not necessarily accepted) by Hartman— 
binds the individual and perhaps his interpretive community from 
then on to its verisimilitude. 
I close with what for me is the curious and fascinating 
phenomenon of the pomo Mailloux leaping over the neo-classicist 
Rothstein to find his source in a Hellenic theological genius (Saint 
Paul), a source probably foreign to the thinking of the thoroughly 
secularized New York Times columnist. But then, I have been 
writing for years about the irony that deconstructionism originates 
in the Gospel writers." Their "truth" was, precisely, that no text— 
however long-standing and sacred its interpreters' understanding 
of it may be—^is impervious to new readings that may, without 
erasing it entirely, upset its basic meaning. Whether such a 
methodology is good or bad is a subject for another day;" that it 
has led to hermeneutic distortion throughout several millennia of 
western culture seems clear. 
10 The most forceful antagonism to the textual distortions needed to make the Old 
Testament a predictor of the New comes of course from Nietzsche, most keenly in The 
Dawn of Day, aphorism 84. For a milder re-iteration of this point by a Christian 
theologian, see, e.g., GEORGE M. SMIGA, PAIN AND POLEMIC: ANTI-JUDAISM IN THE 
GOSPELS (1992). 
11 See Weisberg, supra note 4. 
" For a recent excellent discussion of the connections among pomo, religious 
hermeneutics, and infinitely flexible readings of texts, see Peter Goodrich, Europe in 
America: Grammatology, Legal Studies, and the Politics of Transformation, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2033,2065 (2001). 
